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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
The basic logic and methodology used in this study is described in Part III.B. This appendix is for technically-oriented
readers who are interested in more detail concerning the databases, research design, statistical models, and computer packages used in the study, and in how various indices were
calculated.
I. SENTENCING AS A UNITARY OR BIFURCATED DECISION

Researchers must decide whether to treat sentencing as a
unitary or bifurcated decision. Those taking the bifurcated approach treat it as two separate decisions. First, the judge decides whether to incarcerate a defendant or use probation or an
alternative sanction. Then, for those defendants who are incarcerated, the judge decides how long a term of imprisonment is
appropriate. The two stages are modeled separately. Logistic
regression is used to analyze the imprisonment decision for all
offenders. Least squares multiple regression is used to model
the decision regarding sentence length only
for those offenders
158

who receive a sentence of imprisonment.

The bifurcated approach has an important advantage: it
does not assume that the same set of factors affect both decisions equally. Empirical analysis suggests that many factors,
such as employment, affect one decision but not the other.'5 9
For example, judges may be influenced by a defendant's potential job loss in deciding whether to incarcerate, so the employment factor would receive some weight in that model. But if the
decision is made that incarceration is necessary, employment
may have little influence on the decision concerning how long
to imprison. Separate models for the in/out and imprisonment
length decisions permit more precise weighting of the factors
that affect each particular decision.

I See, e.g., MCDONALD & CARLSON,
'9

RICH

ETAL.,

supra note 16, at 82.

supranote 18, at 59.
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Several considerations prevented us from using this standard bifurcated approach, however. First, our model-with
judges nested within cities and interactions among judges and
offense types-has a very large number of parameters. The iterative calculations needed for the maximum likelihood estimates in logistic regression exceeded the capacity of the
computer resources available at the Commission and at a large
Second, excluding offenders who reresearch university.
ceived no prison time from the second analyses concerning imprisonment length would destroy the comparability of caseloads
needed for our analysis. Because judges differ in the proportion and types of cases wherein the defendant is sent to prison,
studying sentence lengths only among the imprisoned caseloads
would make the caseloads among different judges incomparable.
Treating the decision as a unitary decision permits us to include all offenders in the analysis, but it also raises new issues.
Researchers taking a unitary approach have viewed the sentence
imposed as a reflection of the judge's ranking of the case on an
unobservable unitary dimension-the severity of punishment
deserved by the offender. Imprisonment, as opposed to a nonincarcerative alternative, results when a case falls above a certain
threshold level on this unobserved severity scale. This view has
led researchers to adopt one of several research strategies for
modeling the sentencing decision as a single decision.
Some studies attempt to translate the variety of observable
sentences, such as fines, probation, or various months of imprisonment, into values on a single severity scale. Statistical
analysis then identifies factors that predict where on this scale
particular cases fall. Severity scales have been constructed for
use with federal cases."' But several problems with this approach are apparent. Validation of the scales has been difficult,
and severity ratings are not as meaningful to policymakers as are

'6' Discussion with representatives of the SAS Institute confirmed that the complexity of the model made the calculation very resource-intensive.

See MICHAEL HINDELANG ET AL., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS1974, at 401 (1975); L. PAuL SuTroN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING: PERSPECTIVES OF
1

ANALYSIS AND A DESIGN FOR RESEARCH 23 (1978).
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observable and concrete decisions, such as whether to imprison
and for how long. For these reasons, we chose to use months in
prison as our unitary outcome measure.
Using months of imprisonment as the outcome raises an
additional issue. Since cases receiving probation or other alternatives receive zero months of imprisonment, this may represent a truncation of the true underlying severity scale. Some
probation cases deserve more severe punishment than others,
but these differences are not reflected in the observable measure. Treating all non-prison sentences as zero months leads to a
form of selection bias that can distort the weights assigned to
the predictive factors in the model."2
Several methods have been proposed to correct for this distortion, but all have problems of their own. TOBIT analysis is
commonly used to study sentencing as a unitary decision, but it
requires that identical factors affect both the imprisonment and
sentence length decisions. 16 Furthermore, examination of data
on sentences imposed for federal offenses does not support the
use of a TOBIT distribution.1 6 Other methods have been developed in the econometric literature, 10 but these require extensive a priori specification of the factors likely to affect each
decision, which often is impossible.'r
Given these countervailing considerations, we chose to conduct a unitary analysis on the entire population of offenders
treating sentences of probation or any form of non-prison alternative, including home or community confinement, as zero
months imprisonment. Given that our concern is not to establish the weights of an exhaustive list of factors that explain sentence length, but only to examine changes in the influence of
,62See generallyJeffreyA. Dubin & Douglas Rivers, Selection Bias in LinearRegression,
Logit and Probit Models, in MODERN METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 410 (John Fox & J.
Scott Long eds., 1990).
' See generally Steven Klepper et al., Discrimination in the CriminalJustice System: A
Critical Appraisal of the Literature, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 55 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
'6 See, e.g., McDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 18, at 59.
See generally G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN
ECONOMETRICS (1983) (switching regression); JamesJ. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias

as a66SpecificationError,47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979) (sequential equation model).
' See Rhodes, supra note 7, at 1031 n. 47.
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one such factor-the identity of the sentencing judge-over
time, we believe this approach is adequate and valid for our limited purposes.
II. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES
A. DATABASES

Our data came from two sources: (1) the 1984 and 1985
Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information System (FPSSIS) and (2) the fiscal years 1994 and 1995 U.S. Sentencing Commission Monitoring data file. We used two-year
time frames for both periods to reduce the possibility that
unique case assignments would interfere with random assign67
ment. Only felony convictions were included in the analyses.'
The FPSSIS file contains information obtained by probation
officers and organized into computer data fies by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. This file includes a description
of the offense, information about the defendant's background
and criminal history, the disposition of the case, and the sentence imposed. The FPSSIS database was maintained for the
years 1984-1990. The Sentencing Commission performed additional reliability checks on the data obtained from the Administrative Office.
The Monitoring data file is based on data collected to meet
the Sentencing Commission's statutory obligation to disseminate information regarding federal sentencing practices. s' The
Commission asks probation officers to submit five documents
for each defendant sentenced under the guidelines: the indictment, the presentence report, the written plea agreement, the
statement of reasons for imposing the sentence, and the judg167 Our datasets contain only offenders who were convicted and sentenced. We do
not include defendants whose cases were dismissed before conviction or who were
acquitted at trial. Since it is case filings, not convictions, that are randomly assigned
to judges, some non-comparability in the sentenced caseloads could emerge ifjudges
differed in their dismissal or acquittal rates. Analysis by other researchers of data on
all filed cases suggest that differences in dismissal and acquittal rates do exist among
judges, but that they are negligible and appear unlikely to explain differences in sentences. Interview withJeffrey 1I Kling, supra note 121.
"8 28 U.S.C. § 995(a) (12), -(15), -(16) (1994).
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ment of conviction order. From these documents staff at the
Commission code demographic information about the defendant, the offense of conviction, the applicable guidelines and
final sentence, and the reasons for any departure from the
guidelines.
B. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

The same explanatory control variables were used in both
analyses: offense type, criminal history, city, andjudge. Because
we wanted the results from the two time periods to be strictly
comparable, we used only variables that could be measured precisely the same way in the two datasets. Offenses were categorized into twenty-five general types. The offenses are: Murder,
Kidnaping/Hostage, Sexual Abuse, Assault, Robbery (including
Bank), Drug Trafficking, Firearms, Burglary/Breaking and Entering, Auto Theft, Larceny, Fraud, Embezzlement, Forgery/Counterfeiting, Bribery, Tax Offenses, Racketeering,
Gambling/Lottery, Civil Rights, Immigration, Pornography/Prostitution, Prison Offenses, Administration of Justice,
Environmental Offenses, National Defense, and "Other offenses." There are, of course, variations in the seriousness of offenses within each of these types, which, if measured, would
undoubtedly increase the amount of sentence variation accounted for by offense type.
For some analyses, only selected subsets of these offenses
were used in order to reduce the number of cells in the threeway (offense type x criminal history x judge (city)) factorial design that had zero or small numbers of cases. Offenders were
categorized into two criminal history groups-those with and
those without any previous convictions. Due to the limited information available in the 1984/1985 dataset on the nature or
the prior record, no more precise measurement of prior record
was possible. In 1984-1985, 51% of the defendants had no prior
criminal record; in 1994-1995, 48% had no prior criminal record.
The judge variable was treated as nested within cities, since
judges sit in only one city (i.e., the judge factor does not cross
the city factor). The judge variable was defined as a categorical
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variable with each judge given a separate value. This is equivalent to creating a dummy variable for each judge, and this is in
fact what the GLM procedure that was used for data analysis
does automatically.'6 9
C. OUTCOME VARIABLES

The unitary outcome variable, for reasons described above,
was months of imprisonment imposed. In cases of split sentences, the length of imprisonment was the portion of the senIn accordance with
tence that was spent behind bars.
procedures used in other Commission research, life sentences
were treated as 470 months, which is 65 months longer than the
highest within-guideline imprisonment sentence and approximates the average life expectancy of federal defendants receiving sentences of life.
Because a sizeable portion of defendants receive zero
months of imprisonment and some receive life in prison, the
outcome variable distribution is W-shaped rather than normal
and shows some right "skewness." Analysis of variance assumes a
normal distribution, but tests of normality performed on our
data suggest that the effects of these violations are likely to be
slight.
We conducted some analyses' 70 using as outcome the expected time to be served. This was estimated with algorithms
tailored to the conditions of each time period. For the preguidelines cases, the expected time to be served was based on a
simulation of the parole guidelines, which were the mechanism
for calculating the time to be served for pre-guideline defendants. For the post guideline defendants, sentences of greater
than one year were reduced by the fifty-four days of good time
that can be earned for such sentences in a year. The calculations for both time periods were based on the assumption that
the defendant would receive all good time available.

"'
'70

See SAS Institute, Inc., SAS/STAT USER'S GUIDE, Release 6.03, at 7.
See supra note 125.
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III. STATISTICAL MODELING AND COMPUTER ANALYSIS

A. ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE FOR THE SENTENCE LENGTH
DECISION

Analyses of the sentence length decision were conducted using the General Linear Model (GLM) procedures available in
SAS. GLM is a versatile package that can be used for analysis of
variance (ANOVA), multiple regression, and other analyses using the method of least squares to fit linear models. GLM allows
users to specify a variety of models and provides sums of squares
and mean squares for each source of variation specified in the
model. Other statistics of interest, such as the proportion of the
total variance accounted for and the effect size associated with a
factor, can be calculated from the sums of squares. In addition,
GLM performs an F-test of the statistical significance of each effect in the model.
Because our design is a "natural experiment" with random
assignment of cases to judges in each city, we find it easiest to
conceive of the statistical analysis as a fixed-effects ANOVA with
judges nested within cities and offense type and criminal history
treated as categorical "covariates" (used as control variables).
GLM is the preferred SAS procedure for ANOVA with unbalanced designs, that is, designs with unequal numbers of cases in
the cells, which is unavoidable in a natural experiment.
Through the concept of estimability, GLM can test various hypotheses regardless of the amount of confounding or missing
data. 7' One can specify which variables are nested and can include interaction terms for any factors that are crossed.
The Type I (or "sequential") sums of squares output provided by GLM is the incremental improvement in the error SS
as each factor is added to the model, in the order specified in
the MODEL statement.172 The analysis is identical to a multiple
regression using a hierarchical analytical strategy, with control
variables entered first, city entered next, the main effect for

" SAS Institute, supra note 169, at 584.

,7 Id. at 586.
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judges entered next, and the interaction terms entered last."' s
The random assignment ensures there is no correlation among
control variables and judges within each city, although there is
some intercorrelation among control variables and cities.
Lindman gives the hierarchy of effects that is appropriate
for an ANOVA with both nested and crossed factors. 74 The offense type by city and the judge (city) effects are at the same
level in the hierarchy. We placed all main effects, including the
judge (city) effect, before any interaction. No interaction terms
were included for the criminal history factor because it was associated with such a small effect. The test of the null hypothesis
for each factor is uncontaminated by effects preceding the factor being tested. The exact model was specified as follows:
Months-in-prison = crinmhist + offtype + city + offtype*city +

judge (city) + offtype*judge (city)
B. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE VARIABLES AND THE ROLE OF
UNMEASURED VARIABLES

Intercorrelation of explanatory variables must be carefully
considered when structuring a multivariate statistical model and
interpreting the results. For example, because defendants convicted of burglary offenses are more likely to have a criminal record than those convicted of tax offenses, determining whether
offense type or criminal history accounts for longer average sentences for burglars is difficult. As shown in the tables in the
text, our explanatory factors together account for between 3439% of the variation in sentences, depending on the time period. About 4% of that is a shared variance that cannot be unambiguously assigned to a single explanatory factor.
The amount of shared variance was determined by comparing the sum of square attributable to the entire model with the
sum of the Type II sums of squares for the individual factors,
obtained from the SAS GLM output. The Type II sum of
squares is the reduction in error attributable to each factor after
all other factors have been taken into account. It is equivalent
'73 See JACOB COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIOR SCIENCES § 3.8.1 (2d ed. 1983).
174SeeLINDMAN,

supra note 128.
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to the square of the semi-partial correlation coefficient for the
factor. The difference between the sum of these for all factors
combined and the model sum of squares is the portion of the
total explained variance that cannot be unambiguously attributable to a particular factor.
We structured the hierarchical model so that the legallyrelevant factors were "credited" with explaining as much variation in sentences as possible. The effects of city and judge were
calculated after adjusting for the part of the variation in sentences that could be accounted for by offense type and criminal
history. Because cases were randomly assigned (thus assuring
no correlation between case characteristics and judges within
each city) the judge effect can be interpreted unambiguously as
the independent influence ofjudges on sentences.
The variance accounted for by our explanatory factors
should be considered a conservative estimate of the influence of
these factors in sentencing, because the limitations of measurement and statistical modeling inevitably introduce error. A
factor with an effect size of four percent, though accounting for
only 4% of the total variance in our outcome, represents over
10% of the variation that we can explain with our model. Some
of the 60+% of variation in sentences that remains unaccounted
for-an amount that decreases only marginally under the guidelines-may represent arbitrariness and disparity. But most of
this amount probably reflects factors that we did not measure,
such as other elements of offense seriousness or offender culpability. Other multivariate studies by Commission researchers
that used a more complete set of explanatory factors have accounted for up to 70% of the variation in sentences under the
guidelines.
Since judges are nested within cities in our model, there is a
confound among judges and cities that must be kept in mind
when interpreting results. Some differences in sentences that
arise from diverse judicial philosophies will appear in our model
as differences among cities. For example, if the judges in a particular city share a more lenient philosophy than in other cities,
this city-wide philosophy is reflected in the city average and
measured by the city effect, not by the judge effect (even

316
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though the individual judges might carry this leniency with
them if they were assigned to a different city). The judge effect
reflects differences among judges relative only to the other
judges in the same city, and is thus a conservative estimate of
the influence of judicial philosophy on sentencing nationwide.
The city effect reflects differences among cities in shared judicial philosophies and also reflects local norms, practices, etc.,
that would impinge on the decision-making of any judge assigned to the city. It also, of course, reflects differences in the
caseloads of various cities, for which we partially control with
our offense type and criminal history independent variables.
In early analyses we included as control variables the race,
gender, and age of offenders. These factors accounted for statistically significant but small amounts of variation. Interpretation of their effects is very difficult, however, because the factors
are intercorrelated with each other and with offense type and
criminal history. Most important, demographic characteristics
are correlated with unmeasured factors that legally influence
sentences. For example, race of the defendant is correlated
with type of cocaine. (Our data for 1984-1985 do not distingnish powder from crack cocaine). Since larger penalties are
imposed on crack cocaine, this difference in the proportion of
African-American offenders involved with crack appears in our
data as a race effect. A richer range of control variables is
needed to adequately assess the independent roles of race, gender, or age in sentencing, which is not possible in a pre/post
study in which variables must be measured identically at both
time periods. Research on discrimination today, using a rich
source of control variables, is presently underway at the U.S.
Sentencing Commission.
C. MEASURES OF THEJUDGE EFFECT AND CHANGES BETWEEN THE
TIME PERIODS

The comparison of greatest interest for this study is the effect associated with judges at the two time periods, after controlling for differences in case characteristics and other inter-city
variation. To assess the size and importance of the judge effect
in the analysis of sentence length, we calculated the unbiased
estimate of the proportion of the total variance in sentence
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lengths associated with each factor, according to the procedure
described in Lindman."75 This is an appropriate measure of the
importance of a factor in ANOVA. (The square root of this statistic is analogous to the semi-partial correlation coefficient asIn
sociated with the factor in a hierarchical regression.)
discussing this proportion, we converted it to a percentage-the
percentage of the total variance in sentences that can be attributed to judges. Only percentages greater than 1% were considered meaningful. 7 The effectiveness of the guidelines was
evaluated by subtracting the percentage obtained in 1994-1995
from the percentage in 1984-1985.
D. LIMITATIONS OF OUR TEST OF CHANGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
INTER-JUDGE DISPARIY

Because our method is not a true experiment (permitting
control over the number of cases in each experimental condition), no test of the statistical significance of the difference in
the R-squared between the two time periods was available. A
model that would provide significance tests-a within-judge repeated-measures design-requires "orthogonality" of the experimental factors, i.e., that the number of cases for each judge
at each time period be equal, or at least that the number of
cases be proportional.'77 This condition is not met with our
data. Some progress has been made in developing significance
tests with unbalanced, nested data,1 78 but these were not available for use as part of this project. Thus, no test of the statistical
significance of changes in the judge effect at the two time periods was possible.
Finally, we are aware that more structured statistical models
are possible, some of which would permit a test of the significance of changes in inter-judge disparity and overcome a bias in
our estimates of the judge effect.179 The model used for our
171

Id. at 38-41.

'76SeeJacob Cohen, A PowerPrimer,112 PsYCH. BULL. 155, 155-56 (1992).
'7 SeeWILJIAML. HAYS, STATISTICS (3rd ed. 1981).
' See generally ANTHONY S. BRYK & STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH, HERARCHICAL LINEAR
MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATAANALYSIS METHODS (1992).

, Letter from Jeffrey R. Kling, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. (Dec. 9, 1997). InterviewwithJeffrey R. Kling (Jan. 29, 1998).
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analysis may underestimate the size of the primary judge effect
if sampling bias plays a role in our estimate of the judge means.
The result of this bias, however, is that we may underestimate
the amount of inter-judge disparity and the degree of improvement brought about by the guidelines. We believe that the
general finding of our study, however, still holds. We hope that
refinements of statistical modeling will continue and a more
precise picture of the effects of the guidelines will emerge.
IV. TESTING THE RANDOMNESS OF CASE ASSIGNMENT

Random assignment has been considered an important
mechanism that prevents attorneys from "shopping" for judges
most likely to be favorable to their case. For this reason, courts
strive for truly random assignment, although they may use other
blind and case-independent procedures that, although technically not random, approximate it for practical purposes. A
computer program is even available to the federal courts for
unbiased case assignment. But ethical and logistical requirements sometimes limit the principle of randomness. For example, judges cannot hear cases in which they have some personal
or family affiliation with one of the attorneys. Cases that are related (e.g., all defendants in a drug conspiracy) may be assigned
to a single judge rather than randomly distributed.
In general, however, a reasonable approximation of randomness is attempted in most cases and in most districts. At an
April 1996 Federal Judicial Center seminar attended by the
chiefjudges of eighty-four of the ninety-four federal judicial districts, sixty-nine (82%) said case assignment is always random.
Ten (12%) said it is random most of the time, with rare exceptions, one (1%) said it is usually random, but with frequent exceptions, and four (5%) said it is never random.
Because the assumption of caseload comparability is fundamental to the logic of our study, we identified and excluded
from subsequent analyses those districts that did not have random assignment at either of the two time periods of our study.
We began with interviews. In 1989, researchers from the FederalJudicial Center visited all district courts and interviewed the
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court clerks.'8° Clerks were asked how cases were assigned to
judges. Most reported that cases were assigned randomly or
"rotationally," meaning that cases were assigned to the next
judge on a list in the order that they were filed. For the court's
purposes, and for ours, the rotational method seems a reasonable approximation of random assignment. In April and May
1996, we called court clerks in cities that met our initial criteria
for inclusion and determined that most continued to use random or quasi-random assignment. While most districts appeared to use assignment procedures that appeared random, in
some cases it was difficult to tell from the information reported.
In addition, it was possible that some districts that reported
random assignment might in fact have violated their procedures. For these reasons we determined that the proper criteria
should be a statistical test.
A. STATISTICAL TESTS OF RANDOMNESS

In his pilot study, Waldfogel used standard statistical techniques to test whether the proportion of male and female offenders assigned to each judge were within the range that is
expected if cases are in fact randomly assigned. He found that
in each of the courts, judges received "approximately the same
fraction of cases with female defendants." Waldfogel used gender of the defendants for these tests because he reasoned that
characteristics such as offense type can be changed (through
superseding indictments and charge dismissals) after the case is
assigned. Because the judge might influence these processes,
he thought it was better to use an immutable defendant characteristic like gender to test whether the proportion of cases was
consistent with random assignment.
We also used statistics to test the assumption of random assignment, but we used race of offender rather than gender.
The overall percentage of females in the federal system is small,
about 15% in 1995, resulting in little chance for wide variation
in the percentage of female defendants across judges. We constructed two-dimensional tables, with race on one dimension
,' Interview protocol, FJC Time Study (on file at the Federal Judicial Center).
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and judges on the other. If case assignment were random, the
proportions of the racial groups would be about the same for
each judge. In statistical terms, the two dimensions would be
"independent."
Several statistical tests were used to assess the independence
of the two dimensions. Chi-square analyses were conducted to
compare the expected distribution of cases with the observed
distribution and estimate the likelihood that the observed distribution could occur through random assignment. For small
cities, with 300-500 cases per year, the chi squares were indeed
nonsignificant. With large cities with more than 500 cases per
year, however, the chi squares were significant at the .001 level.
(Results of these analyses are available from the authors.)
A problem with the chi square is that it is very sensitive to
sample size. Small effects become significant if the number of
cases is very large. Thus, the chi-square analysis essentially identified and eliminated all large districts, even though the departures from randomness were minimal and similar to departures
in smaller cities. To avoid this problem, we decided to measure
the effect size using an R-squared analog. David Knoke and Peter Burke provide an R-squared analog for log-linear analyses,
which we
computed
for each
courthouse
in our sample using
the
CATOD
SS
181
the SAS CATMOD procedure.
We compared the baseline
model (the geometric mean) with the alternative model (which
included the main effects for offense type and judges). For
both the baseline model and this alternative model, we computed the L2 statistic using the formula L2 = 2 f. In (f./F.),
where f, is the observed cell frequency and Fj is the expected
cell frequency. 82 With these two L2 values, we then computed
the R2 analog using the formula R2 analog = [ (L 2 baseline
model) - (L' alternative model)]/(L2 baseline model)."' A
model whose R2 analog is greater than .90 may be presumed to
be sufficiently close to a random distribution that systematic
variation in case assignments to each judge may be ruled out.
This was the criterion we used for including cases in the analy"' DAVID KNOKE & PETERJ. BURKE, LOG-LNEAR MODELS

,12Id. at 30.
'" Id. at

41.

40-42 (1980).
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ses. Twenty-seven cities failed our test at one or both time periods and were eliminated from subsequent analyses.
B. MULTIPLE DEFENDANT CASES

Finally, we considered the effects of an additional limitation
on random assignment. Our analysis concerns sentences imposed on individual defendants. But it is cases, not individuals,
that are assigned randomly. Many cases contain multiple defendants and all defendants in a case are sentenced by the same
In the pre-guideline years covered by our analysis,
judge.
38.2% of all cases involved multiple defendants, and 55% of
drug cases did. The percentages in the guideline years were
similar, 35.6% of all cases and 53.4% of drug cases.
In cities where cases are randomly assigned, each judge will
get a similar share of multiple defendant cases. The concern,
however, is that our statistical test of differences between judges
assumes random assignment of individuals. 4 We need to test
the possibility that differences we uncover among judges might
be due to some judges getting cases with multiple defendants
that are much more or less serious than average.
To assess this possibility we performed several analyses using
only single-defendant cases and compared these results with the
analyses for all cases."" If multiple defendant cases are causing
or exaggerating differences in average sentences among judges,
we would expect the R-squared for judges to be smaller for single defendant cases than for all cases combined. Comparing
the results of the two analyses shows no such pattern. In fact,
the R-squared for judges are more often larger in single defendant cases than in multiple defendant cases. Thus, in our main
analyses we combined single and multiple defendant cases.

" Technically, the ANOVA F-test used to assess the statistical significance of any
differences found among judges assumes random assignment of individual cases. If
assignment is not fully random, somewhat larger differences between judges might be
expected to arise by chance. The p-value will then be underestimated and we could
falsely fail to reject a true null hypothesis.
" Analyses on file with the authors.
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